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A CASE FOR THE LEGALITY OF YOUTH STANDBY
AND YOUNG ADULT AIRLINE FARES
BY STANLEY B. ROSENFIELDt
I. INTRODUCTION
N DECEMBER, 1965, American Airlines filed its youth standby fares,
a no-reservation tariff providing a fare equal to 50%o of the regular
adult coach fare for youths at least 12 years of age and under 22 years
of age.' At the same time, Allegheny Airlines filed its young adult tariff
providing reservation for the same age group at a discounted fare of
66 2/3% of the regular jet coach fare.'
Since these fares were first introduced, they have been under constant
legal attack. Complaints were filed with the Civil Aeronautics Board
(hereinafter referred as CAB or Board) by Delta, Northwest, United,
Western and Trans World Airlines, Transcontinental Bus System, Inc.,'
National Trailways Bus System4 and the American Society of Travel
Agents. The complaints asked that the fares be suspended pending an
investigation, and alleged that the proposed fares were, inter alia, unjustly
discriminatory, preferential, prejudicial, unjust and unreasonable, in
that an artificially selected class of traffic was created, that the only
real difference between this fare and the regular fare was the "space avail-
able" provision and that such reason is insufficient for the difference in
fares. The CAB determined the fares were not unjustly discriminatory and
dismissed the complaints without an investigation, allowing the fares to go
into effect on an experimental basis.'
TCO Industries, Inc.' and National Trailways Bus System (hereinafter
t LL.B. (1951), University of Minnesota School of Law; LL.M. (1970), Southern Methodist
University School of Law; Assistant Professor of Law, De Paul University Law School.
'American Airlines, youth standby fares, filed Dec. 20, 1965. The tariff is subject to "black
out periods" during which it cannot be used, such as the days of heaviest travel during the Christ-
mas and New Year's season. The youth is required to show an identification card when purchasing
his ticket and when boarding the plane. This identification card is purchased from American on
proof of age, for a fee of $3.00, and remains valid until the holder's 22nd birthday. The standby
passenger is boarded only after all reservation passengers and all military standby passengers are
boarded, and the youth is subject to being "bumped" at an intermediate point to make room for
a regular fare reservation passenger.
a Allegheny Airlines, young adult fares, filed Dec. 20, 1965. Allegheny provides for no "black
out periods," so that a youth may ride under this plan on any flight on any day a reservation is
available. Allegheny requires an identification card which is issued on proof of age at the cost of
$10.00 per year.
a An organization composed of 46 independent motor carriers, licensed by the Interstate Com-
merce Commission.
'A national trade association of motor bus operators.
'American Airlines, Inc., Proposed Standby Youth Fares, C.A.B. Order No. E-23137 (Jan. 20,
1966); Allegheny Airlines, Inc., Proposed Young Adult Fares, C.A.B. Order No. E-23138 (Jan. 20,
1966).
"The new name of Transcontinental Bus System, Inc. adopted after commencement of this
proceeding.
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jointly referred to as TCO) filed an appeal to the Court of Appeals which
held that while the question of unjust discrimination is ultimately a fact
question for determination by the Board, nevertheless it is an abuse of
Board discretion to make such determination without an evidentiary hear-
ing.' The court determined that in deciding whether the circumstances and
conditions affecting youth fares are substantially dissimilar to regular fares,
the Board could consider only such circumstances and conditions as Con-
gress has by statute deemed material and those factors which regulatory
practice in the transportation industry have, through experience, found
relevant.8 The court concluded that factors based on status of traffic, broad
social policy or promotion of traffic may not be considered." It, therefore,
remanded the case to the Board to make its determination after a full
hearing.
Upon remand, the Board ordered an investigation, not only of the
American and Allegheny fares but of all youth fares then in effect." On
January 21, 1969, in an 83 page decision, the Hearing Examiner concluded
that neither the youth nor the young adult fares were unjust or unreason-
able, but that both fares were illegal because they were unjustly discrimi-
natory.
n
Because of the intense public interest in this matter, the Board, on its
own motion, issued an order for review by the full Board." The Board
rejected the examiner's conclusion of unjust discrimination. It also re-
jected the basis for the examiner's determination that the rates were just
and reasonable. It remanded the matter to the examiner for further hear-
ings on the question of rate reasonableness and also recognized that the
further hearings could produce evidence which would require a further
review on the question of unjust discrimination.13
After additional evidence is taken and a new determination made by
the examiner, his findings will again be reviewed by the Board. Past his-
tory indicates the airlines are prone to accept the final decisions of the
CAB. However, a ruling adverse to TCO will undoubtedly bring a new
appeal to the court. Thus, after four and one half years of litigation,
there is still no final determination of the legality of the youth and young
adult fares, and final determination is not yet in sight.
The interest created by these fares is indicated by the fact that the CAB
was receiving an average of more than 500 letters per day concerning these
fares," and just prior to the Board hearing in March, 1969, over 10,000
letters and telegrams were received. " These were mainly from young people
'Transcontinental Bus System, Inc. v. C.A.B., 383 F.2d 466 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
390 U.S. 920 (1968).
a1d. at 484.9 id. at 490, 491.
'°C.A.B. Order No. E-26317 (Feb. 5, 1968).
"Initial decision of Arthur S. Present, Hearing Examiner, Civil Aero. Bd., Doc. No. 18936
(Jan. 21, 1969).
12C.A.B. Order No. 69-1-106 (Jan. 27, 1969).
'3 C.A.B. Order No. 69-8-140 (Aug. 27, 1969).
14C.A.B. News Release (Feb. 13, 1969).
'
5 The Wall Street Journal, March 13, 1969, at 13, col. 4.
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in the 12-22 age group and from parents of young people in the affected
age group. However, interest in these fares is not limited to this group.
All bus companies are concerned as direct competitors of the airlines. The
general traveling public is concerned that regular rates not be increased
to help defray the cost of the discount fares.
Finally, the fares introduced by American and Allegheny Airlines have
expanded so that presently 24 air carriers are offering some form of youth
fare. These include all 11 trunk airlines,"6 seven local service carriers, 7 and
six miscellaneous airlines." Eleven of the carriers had only a standby fare,"'
and the same number had only a reservation fare."° Two of the carriers
had both a standby and a reservation fare,"' and three of the carriers also
provided group fares." While some of the fares differed slightly, all stand-
by fares are basically similar to the American plan, and all reserved fare
plans are similar to Allegheny's plan."
While 24 airlines have some form of youth fare in force, only 14 of the
carriers favor these traiffs. Of the remaining ten, three opposed the
fares, and the remaining seven either took no part or have no official
position. Northeast supported the American tariff when it was first pre-
sented in 1965, but is now opposed to it. Delta and Northwest were among
the group which originally petitioned the Board to suspend the tariff,
and both, having instituted the fares defensively, now favor them.
The airlines opposed base their opposition on business judgment." To
allow standby fares prevents flights from leaving on time because the
youths cannot be boarded until just before flight time. When there is
luggage to be checked, additional delay is encountered. False reservations
are made either to prevent full fare passengers from getting a reservation,
thereby leaving space open for standbys, or to leave a reservation to fall
back on, to insure getting space on a particular flight. The unknown num-
" United Airlines, Inc., American Airlines, Inc., Trans World Airlines, Inc., Eastern Airlines,
Inc., Western Airlines, Inc., Braniff Airways, Inc., Delta Air Lines, Inc., National Airlines, Inc.,
Continental Air Lines, Inc., Northeast Airlines, Inc. and Northwest Airlines, Inc.
17 Bonanza Air Lines, Inc., West Coast Airlines, Inc., Pacific Air Lines, Inc., Central Airlines,
Inc., Frontier Airlines, Inc., Lake Central Airlines, Inc. and Allegheny Airlines, Inc.
5s Pan American World Airways, Inc.; two helicopter operators, New York Airways, Inc., San
Francisco & Oakland Helicopter Airlines, Inc. and the two Hawaiian carriers, Alaska Airlines, Inc.
19 Alaska Airlines, Inc., Aloha Airlines, Inc., American Airlines, Inc., Hawaiian Airlines, Inc.,
New York Airways, Inc., Northwest Airlines, Inc., Pan American World Airways Inc., San Fran-
cisco & Oakland Helicopter Airlines, Inc., United Airlines, Inc. and Western Air Lines, Inc.
'0 Air West, Inc., Allegheny Airlines, Inc., Braniff Airways, Inc., Delta Air Lines, Inc., Eastern
Air Lines, Inc., Frontier Airlines, Inc., National Airlines, Inc., North Central Airlines, Inc., Ozark
Air Lines, Inc., Southern Airways, Inc. and Trans-Texas Airways, Inc.
2 Continental Air Lines, Inc. and Northeast Airlines, Inc.
2 American Airlines, Inc., Braniff Airways, Inc. and Delta Air Lines, Inc.
'aThe youth standby fares have remained at 50% of the adult coach fare. On Oct. 1, 1969,
the young adult fares were increased from 6631% to 75% of the adult coach fare.
"Air West, Inc., Allegheny Airlines, Inc., Aloha Airlines, Inc., American Airlines, Inc., Con-
tinental Air Lines, Inc., Delta Air Lines, Inc., Frontier Airlines, Inc., Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., North
Central Airlines, Inc., Northwest Airlines, Inc., Ozark Air Lines, Inc., Southern Airways, Inc.,
Trans-Texas Airways, Inc. and Trans World Airlines, Inc.
' National Airlines, Inc., United Air Lines, Inc. and Northeast Airlines, Inc.
" Alaska Airlines, Inc., Braniff Airways, Inc., Eastern Air Lines, Inc., Pan American World
Airways, Inc., Western Air Lines, Inc., New York Airways, Inc. and San Francisco & Oakland
Helicopter Airlines, Inc.
17 The only airline not basing its opposition on business consideration is Northeast Airlines,
which claims the fare is uneconomic on its basically short (such as New York-Boston) routes.
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ber of standbys presents a problem of carrying sufficient food, and when a
standby youth does not get a served meal, though he will be given a meal
ticket to be used in the airport on arrival, it is a cause of embarrassment
to the youth and causes ill-will to the airline. Parents do not understand
the fares, and object when a child may be required to take a plane 24 or
more hours after intended departure. Finally, these airlines claim there are
many phone calls from prospective standby travelers trying to determine
the probability of getting on a certain flight. That the objection for the
airlines is business judgment is further enforced by the fact that United,
while opposing the fares, admits that economically youth fares are success-
ful, providing a profit for United. "
The Board has recognized not only the widespread interest in these
fares, but also their importance, by taking the unusual step of allowing
two different groups to intervene and file briefs in the remanded proceed-
ings even though their petitions were not timely filed. The basis of this
action was that the petitioners were user groups, and no user group had
previously been represented in the proceedings."
The bus companies, the affected age group and parents, the general
public, the airlines in favor and the airlines opposed each have their own
opinion according to their particular interest. The final determination,
however, will eventually rest on fare lawfulness, whether the rates are
just and reasonable, and, even if the rates are discriminatory, whether or
not they are unjustly discriminatory. Just and reasonable is a determination
that rate level has some reasonable relationship to attainable cost level.
This article is directed to the question of discrimination. It is the thesis
of this writer that there are legal bases for the youth standby and young
adult fares. It will be shown that legal history, precedent and analysis sug-
gest that these fares are not discriminatory in the first instance, but even if
they are discriminatory, they are still lawful in that they are not unjustly
discriminatory.
II. STANDARDS OF FARE LAWFULLNESS
A. In General
Section 404 (a) of the Federal Aviation Act (hereinafter referred to as
the Act) spells out the duty of every air carrier to establish just and rea-
sonable rates. " Section 404 (b) prohibits undue or unreasonable preference
" Oral testimony of manager of tariffs, United Air Lines, Inc., before Arthur S. Present, Hear-
ing Examiner, Civil Aeronautics Board, Doc. No. 18936.
20 C.A.B. Order No. 69-2-76 (Feb. 14, 1969), accepting the petition of National Student Mar-
keting Corporation, a corporation engaged in the distribution and sale of youth fare identification
cards pursuant to a contract with American Airlines.
C.A.B. Order No. 69-2-106 (Feb. 20, 1969), accepting the petition of National Students'
Association, an educational and cultural non-profit corporation with membership of 1,300,000 stu-
dents from 350 colleges and universities.
3049 U.S.C. § 1374(a) (1958) provides: "It shall be the duty of every air carrier to provide
and furnish interstate and overseas air transportation, as authorized by its certificate, upon reasonable
request therefor and to provide reasonable through service in such air transportation in connection
with other air carrier; to provide safe and adequate service, equipment, and facilities in connection
with such transportation; to establish, observe, and enforce just and reasonable individual and
joint rates, fares, and charges, and just and reasonable classifications, rules, regulations, and practices
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or advantage, unjust discrimination, or undue or unreasonable prejudice or
disadvantages." These prohibitions have been divided into three rules, the
language for which has been taken from the statutory section giving the
Board the power to prescribe rates and practices of air carriers whenever
it finds that a rate or practice is:
(1) unjust or unreasonable,
(2) unjustly discriminatory,
(3) unduly preferential or prejudicial.3 2
It is not unusual for the Board or a court to speak of "unjust discrimi-
nation" when it really means "unjust and unreasonable" or "unduly
preferential or prejudicial." This is due to the use of loose language, and
the failure to make what is, in many instances, a very fine distinction. In
addition, analysis indicates that while the term "discrimination" from its
historical basis in the Interstate Commerce Act relates specifically to the
practice of rebate," its use in the airline industry has followed the laymen's
definition of a distinction in treatment.' The result is that, in fact, each
of the above prohibitions is a discrimination, but the distinction between
each is based on the type of discrimination. Thus, rates that are unjust
and unreasonable are rates that are discriminatory based on rate structure;
unjust discrimination is discrimination which is based on service or to
persons; and undue preference or prejudice is discrimination which is
based on distance or location.
A typical example of undue preference or prejudice is the practice of
common faring, i.e., the practice of charging the same fare to two points
which are different distances from the point of origin." The Board has,
however, limited undue prejudice and preference to this type case only,
and it is not, therefore, a factor in the youth standby or young adult fare.
Accordingly, this chapter will be limited to a consideration of what is
"unjust and unreasonable" and "unjustly discriminatory."
relating to such air transportation; and, in case of such joint rates, fares, and charges, to establish
just, reasonable, and equitable divisions thereof as between air carriers participating therein which
shall not unduly prefer to prejudice any of such participating air carriers."
3149 U.S.C. § 1374(b) (1958) provides: "No air carrier or foreign air carrier shall make,
give, or cause any undue or unreasonable preference or advantage to any particular person, port,
locality, or description of traffic in air transportation in any respect whatsoever or subject any
particular person, port, locality, or description of traffic in air transportation to any unjust dis-
crimination or any undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage in any respect whatsoever."
349 U.S.C. § 1482 (1958) provides: "Whenever, after notice and hearing, upon complaint, or
upon its own initiative, the Board shall be of the opinion that any individual or joint rate, fare,
or charge demanded, charged, collected or received by any air carrier for interestate or overseas
air transportation, or any classification, rule, regulation, or practice affecting such rate, fare, or
charge, or the value of the service thereunder, is or will be unjust or unreasonable, or unjustly
discriminatory, or unduly preferential, or unduly prejudicial, the Board shall determine and pre-
scribe the lawful rate, fare, or charge (or the maximum or minimum, or the maximum and mini-
mum thereof) thereafter to be demanded, charged, collected, or received, or the lawful classifica-
tion, rule, regulation, or practice thereafter to be made effective . . .
33 See VI.
"Tm RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, 411, col. 1 (Unabr. ed.
1967).
'Hilo Mainland Temporary Service Investigation, C.A.B. Order No. E-25252 (June 6, 1967);
Northern Consolidated Airlines, Inc., Proposed Fares, 33 C.A.B. 440 (1961); The Hawaiian Com-
mon Fares Case, 10 C.A.B. 921 (1949).
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B. Statutory Provisions
In addition to Section 404 of the Act, discussed in the preceding section,
several other provisions must be considered to determine just and reason-
able rates which are not unjustly discriminatory. Section 403 sets out the
requirements placed on an air carrier, and requires that all tariffs shall be
filed with the Board and shall be kept open to public inspection." In addi-
tion, an air carrier is required to charge the rates set out in its tariff, and
cannot vary from its tariffs except in the instance of certain specified per-
sons, as listed therein." Finally, no change may be made in any rate or
tariff until after appropriate notice and publication of the proposed
changes.
Sections 403 and 404 spell out the obligations of air carriers in regard
to tariffs. Nowhere in these sections, or anywhere else in the Act, is a defi-
nition of either "unjust and unreasonable" or "unjustly discriminatory"
provided. It has, however, been determined that in any interpretation and
application of these terms the declaration of policy set out in Section 102
and the rules of ratemaking set out in Section 1002 must be considered.'
Section 102 is entitled "Declaration of Policy: The Board," and provides
' 49 U.S.C. § 1373 (a) (1960) provides: "Every air carrier and every foreign air carrier shall
file with the Board, and print, and keep open to public inspection, tariffs showing all rates, fares,
and charges for air transportation between points served by it, and between points served by it
and points served by any other air carrier or foreign air carrier when through service and through
rates shall have been established, and showing to the extent required by regulations of the Board,
all classifications, rules, regulations, practices, and services in connection with such air transporta-
tion. Tariffs shall be filed, posted, and published in such form and manner, and shall contain such
information, as the Board shall by regulation prescribe; and the Board is empowered to reject any
tariff so filed which is not consistent with this section and such regulations. Any tariff so rejected
shall be void . . . "
3' 49 U.S.C. § 1373(b) (1960) provides: "No air carrier or foreign air carrier shall charge or
demand or collect or receive a greater or less or different compensation for air transportation, or
for any service in connection therewith, than the rates, fares, and charges specified in its currently
effective tariffs; and no air carrier or foreign air carrier shall, in any manner or by any device,
directly or indirectly, or through any agent or broker, or otherwise, refund or remit any portion of
the rates, fares, or charges so specified, or extend to any person any privileges or facilities, with
respect to matters required by the Board to be specified in such tariffs, except those specified there-
in. Nothing in this Act shall prohibit such air carriers or foreign air carriers, under such terms
and conditions as the Board may prescribe, from issuing or interchanging tickets or passes for free
or reduce-rate transportation to their directors, officers, and employees (including retired directors,
officers, and employees who are receiving retirement benefits from any air carrier or foreign air
carrier), the parents and immediate families of such officers and employees, and the immediate
families of such directors; widows, widowers, and minor children of employees who have died
as a direct result of personal injury sustained while in the performance of duty in the service of
such air carrier or foreign air carrier; witnesses and attorneys attending any legal investigation
in which any such air carrier is interested; persons injured in aircraft accidents and physicians and
nurses attending such persons; immediate families, including parents, of persons injured or killed
in aircraft accidents where the object is to transport such persons in connection with such acci-
dent; and any person or property with the object of providing relief in cases of general epidemic,
pestilence, or other calamitous visitation; and, in the case of overseas or foreign air transportation,
to such other persons and under such other circumstances as the Board may by regulations pre-
scribe. Any air carrier or foreign air carrier, under such terms and conditions as the Board may
prescribe, may grant reduced-rate transportation to ministers of religion on a space-available basis."
3' 49 U.S.C. § 1373 (b) (1960) provides: "No change shall be made in any rate, fare, or charge,
or any classification, rule, regulation, or practice affecting such rate, fare, or charge, or the value
of the service thereunder, specified in any effective tariff of any air carrier or foreign air carrier,
except after thirty days' notice of the proposed change filed, posted, and published in accordance
with subsection (a) of this section . . . "
"'National Airlines, Inc., DC-6 Daylight Coach Case, 14 C.A.B. 331 (1951); Hawaiian Com-
mon Fares Case, 10 C.A.B. 921 (1949).
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that the Board shall consider, among other things, the following as being
in the public interest:
(1) the encouragement and development of air transportation;
(2) the recognition and preservation of the inherent advantages of air trans-
portation;
(3) the promotion of adequate, economical and efficient service at reasonable
rates and without unjust discrimination or undue preference;
(4) competition necessary to assure sound development of air transportation;
(5) promotion of air safety; and
(6) promotion and development of civil aeronautics.'
The language of this provision that the Board shall consider among other
things the six policy considerations shows clearly the congressional in-
tention that these considerations should not be exclusive. The Board has
confirmed this interpretation and determined that this section provided
only some of the elements to be considered in the public interest."1
The other section of the Act which the Board is required to take into
consideration in a determination of rates is Section 1002 (e),' titled "Rule
of Ratemaking," and providing that among other considerations, that the
Board shall consider the following in determining air rates:
(1) effect of rate on movement of traffic;
(2) need for adequate and efficient service at lowest cost consistent with such
service;
(3) standards of service to be rendered;
(4) inherent advantages of air transportation; and
(5) need of each carrier for revenue sufficient to provide adequate and effic-
ient air service.
Both of the above sections were first enacted in the original Civil Avia-
tion Act of 1933.' In fact, all four sections here considered, were derived
from the original Act of 1938 with only minor changes in phrasing and
no substantive changes. Major changes were made in the Act in 1958, but
still without material change in these sections."
The Board has held that Section 1002 gives the Board authority to en-
force the provisions of 404 (a) prohibiting unjust and unreasonable rates
and 404 (b) prohibiting unjust discrimination and undue preference. In
exercising this authority,' the Board shall consider, among others, those
factors set out in Section 1002 (e). In addition, the Board must also be
guided by the elements of the public interest in air transportation as set
out in Section 102.'
C. Unjust or Unreasonable Rates
It is not necessary to be an economist or to cite legal precedent for the
proposition that a rate must be economically sound. A rate must cover all
4049 U.S.C. § 1302 (1958).
41Air Passenger Tariff Discount Investigation, 3 C.A.B. 242 (1942).
4249 U.S.C. § 1482(e) (1958).
4'Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1301, 1542 (1958), formerly 52 Stat. 980 (1938).
" 2 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 3767 (1958).
4"U.S.C. § 1482(d) (1958).
'National Airlines, Inc., DC-6 Daylight Coach Case, 14 C.A.B. 331 (1951); the Hawaiian
Common Fares Case, 10 C.A.B. 921 (1949).
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of the direct and indirect costs involved in doing business and, in addi-
tion, must provide a reasonable profit to the investors. It is simply not
sound business policy to provide a product or service without adequate
compensation. This policy applies to any type of business, whether private
or public.
The accepted principle in transportation ratemaking, to insure the con-
tinued existence of transportation service, is that the rate levels must have
a reasonable relationship to attainable cost levels.4 ' While it is not necessary
that a rate meet all costs of operation at all times, it must nevertheless be
reasonably related to the cost of doing business," and it must at all times
be reasonably related to an expected future level of costs.4' If a rate is un-
economically low, it will place an undue burden on other types of traffic
without compensatory benefit.
In basic types of service, such a regular first class or coach service, the
proposed fare must be capable of meeting the "fully allocated" costs of
the service," i.e., all costs of doing business, of whatever nature, must be
covered.
In addition to this test, the Board had developed the "profit-impact"
test. A fare designed to increase traffic during off-peak hours or during
periods of low-load cannot be expected to meet the test of full allocation
of costs, because the capacity is not geared to reduce fare traffic." With
promotional fares, the "profit-impact" test is applied and it is required
that a ". . . promotional fare must generate sufficient new traffic to offset
the loss of revenue from self-diversion plus the added cost of carrying the
additional traffic."' As early as 1948, the Board said that rates need not
meet fully allocated costs at all times, although they must be reasonably
related to costsZ3
The key factor in determining whether the profit-impact test should be
applied is whether the carrier schedules for the traffic involved. The basis
of this type promotional fare is that it will utilize otherwise empty seats.
Promotion of the otherwise empty seat is an important consideration be-
cause air traffic is inflexible as to capacity. While a train can add or remove
cars according to demand, an airline can only add or remove airplanes, and
because of the tremendous investment in each airplane, it is not economic-
ally feasible to have extra sections "standing by" for possible use.
It was argued that because the space is available whether or not used,
there is no additional cost involved. 4 The added cost must, however, be
fully covered if it is not to become a burden on other types of traffic.
Promotional rates must be fixed, if they are sound, not only with due re-
" Pittsburgh-Philadelphia No Reservation Fare Investigation, 34 C.A.B. 508 (1961); Air Freight
Rate Investigation, 9 C.A.B. 340 (1948).
"'Air Freight Rate Investigation, 9 C.A.B. 340 at 345 (1948).
4
'Id. at 345.
"Summer Excursion Fares Case, 11 C.A.B. 218 (1950).
5Family Fare Tariffs--Complaint of Transcontinental Bus System, Inc., C.A.B. Order No.
E-26431 (Feb. 29, 1968), 2 Av. L. REP. 21,782, at 14,555 (1968).
52ld. at 14,558.
"Air Freight Rate Investigation, 9 C.A.B. 340, 345 (1948).
"4 Id. The no cost theory.
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gard to the traffic they are expected to generate, but also with sufficient re-
gard for attainable costs to assure that the rates will not have to be raised
when the expected volume of traffic is realized." Once the stimulation of
the discounted fare has resulted in enough new traffic to require expansion
of the operations to accommodate it, unless the fare is then reasonably re-
lated to the fully allocated costs of the service, it becomes unreasonable."
When it is determined that the profit-impact test is appropriate, then
it must be determined whether the additional traffic gained by the pro-
motional fare is sufficient to affect the loss that will be occasioned by the
diversion from full fare traffic, together with the added cost of carrying
the additional traffic." The additional cost of carrying the promotional
traffic is the sum of the costs directly attributable to this fare. Such items
as the advertising for this fare and the costs of ticketing people are allo-
cated to this traffic. Those items of cost not directly attributable to this
traffic, such as the cost of unused space still remaining, are not included.
The much more difficult problem is the determination of the generation-
diversion ratio, i.e., does the additional traffic generated by the promotional
fare offset the diversion from full fare traffic. This involves only a determi-
nation of the facts, but the facts are difficult to determine. As the Board
stated in the recent Family Fare Tariffs case,
In the absence of some indication to the contrary it is reasonable to assume
that the carriers would not urge the continuance of . . . tariffs unless, as
corporations operated with a profit motive, it was to their advantage to do
SO.5
D. Unjust Discrimination
The fact that a fare is different from another fare is not sufficient
grounds to bring it within the proscription of the Act, providing such
fare is offered at the same price to the general public. When National
Airlines filed a tariff providing, for the first time, for daylight coach serv-
ice, the fare was lower than the fare for first class carriage on the same
flight. However, the fare was available to any member of the public desir-
ing to travel by coach and the Board held that while the tariff filed may
present a problem of whether such rate is just and reasonable, there was
no issue of discrimination."
Under Section 404 (b) a rate is not illegal merely because it is discrimi-
natory. The prohibition applies only to a rate that is unjustly discrimina-
tory. There is no absolute rule to be rigidly applied and requiring absolute
uniformity. It is, rather, a rule of reason, one requiring that the circum-
stances and conditions surrounding the discrimination be examined before
determining that a rate comes within the prohibition of the Act." As the
55 Air Freight Rate Investigation, 9 C.A.B. 340, 345 (1948).
'"Trans World Airlines, Inc., Rates for Phonograph Records, C.A.B. Order No. E-22935 (Nov.
26, 1965).
57Family Fare Tariffs--Complaint of Transcontinental Bus Systems, Inc., C.A.B. Order No.
E-26431 (Feb. 29, 1968), 2 Av. L. REP-. 5 21,782 (1968).
581d. at 14,558.
"National Airlines, Inc., DC-6 Daylight Coach Case, 14 C.A.B. 331 (1951).
"Texas & Pacific R.R. Co. v. I.C.C., 162 U.S. 197 (1896); Transcontinental Bus System v.
C.A.B., 383 F.2d 466 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 920 (1968).
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Act itself does not define an unjust discrimination, the Board has taken
the definition of the Interstate Commerce Acte (ICA), which provides
that a rate is unjustly discriminatory if it grants different treatment to
like traffic for like and contemporaneous service offered under substantially
similar circumstances and conditions."
The fundamental rule in unjust discrimination is the rule of equality.
The Supreme Court affirmed the rule of equality in referring to the ICA
as follows: "The great purpose of the Act to regulate commerce . . . was
to secure equality of rates as to all, and to destroy favoritism . . . by pro-
hibiting . . . forbidden rebates, preferences and all other forms of undue
discrimination.""'
1. Like Traffic
The first requirement of the rule against unjust discrimination is that
the traffic receiving the same service at different prices be "like." This
term has seldom been investigated by the Board, the Interstate Commerce
Commission (ICC) or the courts. An indication of one allowable differ-
ence in traffic was noted by the ICC when it held that no discrimination
was involved where one rate was charged for shipment in standard sized
cartons (of a certain size), and another, higher rate set for over-sized
cartons, because the different rates applied to different traffic, each kind
of traffic being open on equal terms to all shippers. 4 Unjust discrimination
of a like kind of traffic is prohibited, but there can be no discrimination
where the traffic is of different kinds or classes not competitive with each
other."
What makes differences in traffic? There are many different tariffs under
the ICC regulation, which apply to many different commodities and differ-
ent types of goods. Nevertheless, it does not appear that there has ever
been a studied analysis of what constitutes different types of traffic, and
how far such differences may extend. Can different persons or groups of
persons be "unlike" traffic, i.e., can children, or a specified age group be
"unlike" traffic vis-a-vis regular fare adults? No cases under the ICC or
the CAB have so far considered the question.
2. Like and Contemporaneous Service
It is difficult to separate like and contemporaneous service from sub-
stantially similar circumstances and conditions, and in many instances no
attempt is made to distinguish these factors. Even if the services are not
like and contemporaneous, a question still remains as to whether there is
sufficient difference between the services offered to treat each differently
without involving a discrimination.
The CAB has held that a sacrifice of convenience and the risk that space
6149 U.S.C. 5 102 (1964).
62Wight v. United States, 167 U.S. 512 (1897); Transcontinental Bus System, Inc. v. C.A.B.,
383 F.2d 466 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 920 (1968); 11 C.A.B. 218 (1950).
6 New York, New Haven & Hartford R.R. Co. v. I.C.C., 200 U.S. 361, 391-92: (1906).
'"National Knitted Outerwear Association v..Akron, Canton?& Youngstown R.R. Co., 156
I.C.C: 629 (1929).
6Pa. Miller's State Ass'n v. Philadelphia & Reading Ry. Co., 8 I.C.C. 531 (1900).
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will not be available on the flight desired by the passenger is sufficient to
distinguish the service and make it "unlike.""
In Family Fare Tariffs,"7 the Board found that the services were "unlike"
even with a reservation under a family fare plan because the family fare
rates were limited to certain days of the week even though a passenger
traveling under the family fare plan is entitled to all of the inflight serv-
ices and amenities accorded regular fare passengers. The Board found the
inconvenience and restrictions attendant upon use of the plan only on
certain days of the week sufficient to differentiate it from regular fare
traffic.
The Supreme Court rejected the contention that the ICA did not pro-
hibit more service to one than to another, but only provided that where the
same service was provided the charge should be equal. The Court held that
it was an unjust discrimination to charge different rates to different ship-
pers for the same service.
The same result is reached when a special service is provided, but it is
offered only to a select group. Offering a special excursion fare to groups
of 25 students would unjustly discriminate against groups of 25 who were
not students, no evidence having been offered to prove that the costs of
selling the service to the student group would be less than to any other
group." This result was again reached by the Supreme Court where a
railroad offered warehousing to some customers at one cost and at another
cost to other customers."°
3. Substantially Similar Circumstances and Conditions
Assuming that a rate provides like service to like traffic, nevertheless if
the circumstances and conditions are substantially different, it may be
sufficient to justify the discrimination and to allow a finding that such is
not unjustly discriminatory.
The question is which circumstances and conditions may be taken into
consideration. In Tour Basing Fares," the Board, in affirming the result
of the Examiner, excepted to his conclusion that only factors directly re-
lating to the carriage itself could be relied upon. The Board said that, at
least where the justification is ascribed to the direct competition of another
transportation medium, the Supreme Court has made it clear that the
Board must look outside the facts of carriage.'
There is no question that circumstances outside those directly relating
to carriage should be considered. This is confirmed by a reading of Sec-
tions 102 and 1002.7' The items listed .are not all directly related to the
"American Airlines, Military Fares, 38 C.A.B. 1038 (1963); Pittsburgh-Philadelphia No
Reservation Fare Investigation, 34 C.A.B. 508.. (196.1).
'Family Fare Tariffs-Complaint of Transcontinental Bus Systems, Inc., C.A.B. No. E-26431
(Feb. 24, 1968), 2 Av. L. REP. 5 21,782 (1968).
"
8 Wight v. U.S., 167 U.S. 512 (1897).
"'Capital Group Student Fares, 25 C.A.B. 280 (1957).
's Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. United States, 305 U.S. 507 (1930); Seaboard Airline Ry. Co. v.
United States, 254 U.S. 57 (1920).
'14 C.A.B. 257 (1951).
'7 Eastern-Central Motor Carriers Ass'n v. United States,* 321 U.S. 194 (1944).
73See II (B ). . . . .. .
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carriage itself, and yet these are factors which Congress has specifically
authorized the Board to use in consideration of rates. Confusion as to the
type of factors to be considered has been caused by looking to the ICA
when it was not applicable. Unlike the CAA, the ICA has two separate
sections in which it considers unjust discrimination-Section 2, which was
originally only charging of different rates for like service,"' and Section 3,
covering the charging of different rates for different service to a limited
class.tm In the early cases, the ICC made a distinction and held that
under Section 2 only those circumstances directly relating to the carriage
itself could be considered, while in a proceeding under Section 3 outside
factors could also be considered."4 However, there have never been multiple
sections in the CAA which required differentiation. Any question of unjust
discrimination must be considered under Section 404(b), and it is clear
that the distinction in the ICA is inapplicable to the CAA.
While there has been some confusion on the factors to be considered,
the Board held early in its existence that it could look at factors outside
the carriage. In Air Passenger Tariff Discount Investigation," a case ques-
tioning the validity of the air travel card, evidence was allowed showing
that in 1939 50% of the air passenger revenue was based on card holders.
The Board sustained the discriminatory rate because the "impetus sub-
scribers have given to development of air transportation." The Board
further concluded that the amount of the discount was relatively small in
relation to the amount of travel purchased by the subscribers and, there-
fore, any discrimination would not be unjust.
In Tour Basing Fares, the Board stated that (speaking specifically of
overruling the Examiner and going outside the carriage itself) if there was
any language in any previous decisions that appeared contrary to this
holding, such decisions should be considered overruled. While the Board
went outside the carriage itself, it found that the only possible effect of
the rate was to increase revenue for the carrier, and even this effect was
doubtful. In finding this not a sufficient consideration in itself to justify a
discriminatory rate, the Board said:
We do not mean, however, to say that an air carrier may never establish a
rate differential .. .on the basis of business considerations. And as we have
previously pointed out, the Supreme Court has held in cases involving sur-
face carriers, that inter-carrier competition . . . may be a justification for a
rate discrimination ... there may be other ascertainable factors of like import
to the welfare of the air carrier or to air transportation generally which may
offer an adequate reason in the public interest for a departure from the public
utility concept embraced in the rule of equality.m
In Free and Reduced Rate Transportation Case," the Board said:
7424 Stat. 379, 5 2 (1887).
7 2 4  Star. 379, § 3 (1887).
' I.C.C. v. Alabama Midland Ry. Co., 168 U.S. 144 (1897); Wight v. U.S., 167 U.S. 512
(1897).
773 C.A.B. 242 (1942).
"'Tour Basing Fares, 14 C.A.B. 257, 259 (1951).
"Free and Reduced Rate Transportation Case, 14 C.A.B. 481 (1951).
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... we may not properly deny consideration at the threshold to a carrier's
asserted justification for a discriminatory fare merely because it stems from
factors outside the carriage itself. However, there was left the problem of
determining what weight we would give to the carrier's reasons for fare
discrimination.'
The Board went on to discuss the carrier contention that management
should be left as free as possible to meet business problems with such pro-
motional devices as their business judgment dictates. The opposition argu-
ment was that all fares must be judged solely in the public utility light
of equal treatment for all. The Board view was that both policies merited
attention. The Board would permit departure from the rule of equality
and thus validate a discriminatory fare "only when an extraordinarily im-
portant and serious business interest of the carrier or of air carriers gen-
erally was involved."'
The Board has here indicated that the carriers should be entitled to pre-
sent any reasons for the proposed tariff, and that upon such presentation
the Board would determine the weight to be given each. Any business
considerations should be heard. The language is clear that it is not a ques-
tion of what evidence may be presented, but the weight to be given such
evidence. The importance of this distinction is that all evidence, of any
nature, that might go to sustaining a rate can be offered by the carrier.
It will then be upon the Board to determine in each particular case how
much weight should be given to each item of evidence. This, of course, is
very different from limiting in advance the items which the carrier may
use in justification of its tariff. The main reason is that any individual item
may or may not be conclusive by itself. In one case one or more items,
when taken together under the circumstances of that particular case, may
be sufficient, while in another specific fact situation the same individual
items may not be important and, therefore, would add little weight to
the carrier argument.
A look at some of the specific considerations presented to the Board in
the past, and the weight the Board has given to specific items can be of
help in determining the direction the Board can be expected to take in
the future.
In Air Passenger Tariff Discount Investigation,' the Board found that
promotion of the air industry and the significant contribution to aviation
was a sufficient justification in itself, and in the Free and Reduced Rate
Transportation Case," the Board said that a factor important to the welfare
of air transportation generally may offer an adequate reason in the public
interest for a departure from the rule of equality. " A difference in cost of
rendering the service is ample justification in itself for corresponding
differences in rates.' Direct competition from another transportation
10ld. at 482-83.
81 Id.
82 3 C.A.B. 242 (1942).
Free and Reduced Rate Transportation Case, 14 C.A.B. 481 (1951).
84 See also, American Airlines, Inc., Fares for Former Employees, 38 C.A.B. 670 (1963).
" American Airlines, Inc., Proposed Standby Youth Fares, C.A.B. Order No. E-23137 (Jan. 20,
1966), accord, American Airlines, Inc., Fares for Former Employees, 38 C.A.B. 670 (1963);
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medium is a sufficient justification."6 Where surface transportation had a
tradition of providing free transportation to travel agents, it was allowed
to the overseas air carriers. It was not, however, allowed to the domestic
carriers because there was no showing of such tradition in domestic sur-
face transportation." Also, the justification for military fares was the
rates that were provided by surface transportation."8
While it did not specify what the factors might be, the Board in one
case said that there may be ascertainable factors important to the welfare
of the air carrier, and this would justify a difference in rates."
In IATA Agreement Providing for North Atlantic Passenger Fares, the
Board justified competition with other airline carriers, in this instance
international carriers vis-a-vis local service carriers. The Board found that
unless the international carriers could lower their rates on one segment
of an international route to match the rate of local service carriers, they
would be unable to compete on that segment of the routes."
While the Board refused to allow a special fare for a group of students,
it indicated it would accept a special fare for a group where it was shown
that the cost of the group was less, and where the rate was open to any
group of the necessary size. 1 Finally, the Board has said that the national
interest is sufficient to sustain a difference in rates, and this is based on
the standby fares for military personnel."
The Board has considered other factors and of the following factors it
has said that each, in itself, is not sufficient to prevent a fare from being
unjustly discriminatory, although a combination may be sufficient. Mere
expectation of carrier profit," probable increase in net revenue, 4 probable
reduction in airline subsidy,' good will ' and social policy were not con-
sidered a sufficient basis to require the lowering of fares."
Probably the most troublesome factor is the promotion of traffic. Dur-
ing the 1950's the Board took the position that the mere promotion of
additional traffic and the expectation of profit or a probable increase in
net revenue could not be the basis of an otherwise discriminatory fare
differential.8 However, these decisions were made when the expansion of
IATA Agreement, Rate and Traffic Matters, 26 C.A.B. 716 (1957); Investigation of Full Adult
Fares for Unaccompanied Children, 24 C.A.B. 408 (1956); Crtificated Air Carrier Military-Tender
Investigation, 28"C.A.B. 902 (1959).
"
5 Tour Basing Fares, 14 C.A.B. 257 (1951).
87Free and Reduced Rate Transportation Case, 14 C.A.B. 481 (1951).
88 American Airlines, Military Fares, 38 C.A.B. 1038 (1963).
"
5 Tour Basing Fares, 14 C.A.B. 257 (1951).
58 IATA Agreement Providing for North Atlantic Passenger Fares, 10 C.A.B. 330 (1949).
' Capital Group Student Fares, 25 C.A.B. 280 (1957).
"'American Airlines, Military Fares, 38 C.A.B. 1038 (1963).
93 American Airlines, Inc., Fares for Former Employees, 38 C.A.B. 670 (1963).
94Id. Group Excursion Fares Investigation, 25 C.A.B. 41 (1957); Tour Basing Fares, 14 C.A.B.
257 (1951).
" Group Excursion Fares Investigation, 25 C.A.B.- 257 (1951).
"Free and Reduced Rate Transportation Case, 14 C.A.B. 481 (1951).
" Investigation of Full Adult Fares for Unaccompanied Children, 24 C.A.B.. 408 (1956).
88 American Airlines, Inc., Fares for Former Employees, 38 C.A.B. 670 (1963); Excursion
Fares Investigation, 25 C.A.B. 41 (195"7); A.T;C. Fire Discounts, 29 C.A.B. 1344 (1959):;" IATA
Agreement, Rteand Traffic Matteis, 26 C.A.B. 716 (1957); Free and Reduced Rate. Transporta-
tion Case, 14 C.A.B. 481 (1951). Capital Group Student Fares, 25 C.A.B. 280 (1957).
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air traffic was not a problem because the airlines were in a profitable, high
traffic periodY' With the advent of larger capacity planes and increased
competition both in and out of the air transportation industry, the Board
became more concerned with the financial stability and profitability of the
air carriers. As early as 1957, the Board said that in the absence of a show-
ing that the Capital Family Fare Plan traffic would be carried below cost,
it is more desirable to leave the solution of financial and competitive prob-
lems to managerial discretion than to substitute the Board's judgment.""
In Mohawk Airlines, Inc., Golden Age Excursion Tariff, the Board allowed
a reduced fare to go into effect although it ordered an investigation on
the basis of Mohawk's alleged need to improve its revenue position and to
improve its load factor. ' In the last few years, when the load factors of
all airlines have been dropping, and the prospect in the next few years is
for new planes with increased capacity, the Board has been encouraging
experimentation with promotional fares designed to utilize available load
capacity. It seems to be the current philosophy of the Board to permit a
promotional fare to go into effect unless it is shown that the fare is un-
reasonable on an experimental basis, and to allow the fare to be continued
if it proves profitable to the airlines. '02
At one extreme is the argument that an airline must be judged solely
in the light of its function as a public utility and its obligation to treat
all members of the public equally. At the other extreme is the desire to
leave the carrier as free as possible to meet business problems with such pro-
motional devices as may appeal to its business judgment, recognizing that
a business enterprise being operated for a profit will not long maintain
rates that are uneconomic. The Board has taken the position that there is
merit in both extremes and it will permit departure from the rule of
equality to invalidate a discriminatory fare ". . . only when an extra-
ordinarily important and serious business interest of the carrier is in-
volved." '
The more recent cases do indicate, however, that an important factor
in the Board's final decision is the current, general financial health of the
industry.
Finally, in one of the latest cases, and one decided by the Board since
the Transcontinental Bus case, the Board held that a reduced rate was.justi-
fied by the factors of long standing tradition, intermodel competition,
improvement of efficiency of air transport, promotion by generating new
traffic and revenue and encouragement of price competition within the
industry.'G4
99 Keyes, Passenger Fare Policies of the Civil Aeronautics Board, 18 J. AT L. & CoM. 46 (19 51).10 Capital Family Plan, 26 C.A.B. 8 (1957).
... Mohawk Airlines, Inc., Golden Age Excursion Tariff, C.A.B. Order No. E-17111 (July 6,
1961).
102 Mohawk Airlines, Inc., Unlimited Travel Fares, C.A.B. Order No. E-26359 (Feb. "14, 1968);
Senior Citizen Standby Fare Proposed by Trans-Caribbean Airways, Inc., C.A.B. Order No. E-23889
(July 1, 1966); Frontier Standby Fares, C.A.B. Order No. E-23128 (Jan. 18, 1966); Delta Airlines,
Inc., Reduced Fares for Youths on a Reserved Seat Basis, C.A.B. Order No. E-23656 (May 9, 1966).
'?Free and Reduced Rate Transportation Case, 14 C.A.B. 481, 483 (1951).
'"Family Fare Tariffs C.A.B. Order No. E-26431 (Feb. 29, 1968), 2 Av. L. REp. 5 21,782
(1968).
1970]
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
III. "STANDING" OF Bus COMPANIES IN AIRLINE RATE DETERMINATION
The first question before the court of appeals was the standing of the
bus companies to challenge airline tariffs. The Board argued that petitioners
must show that those persons, whose interests the relevant portions of the
Federal Aviation Act were designed to protect, are subject to substantial
harm. The court rejected this argument on the ground that the CAB is
charged with protecting the public interest. Preference of one group to
the prejudice of another group because of failure of the CAB to enforce
the provisions of the Act results in a harm to the traveling public. The
court held that the petitioners, by seeking review of the Board action,
were acting in the interest of the public and for the protection of the
public right.'"
The court further held, that to the extent the petitioner's allegations
of uneconomic and unjustly discriminatory tariffs are proved, a harm to
the traveling public is estimated. Unjustly discriminatory rates afford
favored service to those eligible under the tariff, and deprive those not
eligible of equal treatment. Also, uneconomic and unreasonable rates in-
jure the traveling public by jeopardizing the financial stability of the air
carriers or by forcing those persons not eligible to travel at reduced rates
to bear a greater and undue portion of the costs of operation. This shift of
operating costs results in an oppressive burden on the portion of the public
not afforded reduced rates.1"
Although Congress made provision in the Act for the protection of
an aggrieved party,"' and even conceding the court the right to find a
substantial interest on the part of the bus company,' under the facts of
the present case the bus company cannot represent both the interest of the
public and its own interest, because such interests are not compatible.
The public is interested in the lowest possible fare for its transportation,
consistent only with the limitation that it should not be so low that the
transportation company cannot afford to stay in business. This is the pre-
cise purpose of requiring that a fare be reasonable-that it be economic.
However, in the present case the interest of the bus company is to keep
the airline rates up-to keep as large a margin as possible between airline
and bus fares. This is brought out by the allegations of the bus company
in Family Fare Tariffs,' where it charges that the family fares ". . . con-
stitute an unfair competitive practice because they are specifically designed
to divert its bus traffic to air carriers." 0
The bus company is interested in keeping airline rates at the highest
possible level in order to prevent loss of bus traffic. The public interest,
'"Transcontinental Bus System, Inc. v. C.A.B., 383 F.2d 466 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
390 U.S. 920 (1968).
'oId. at 476.
'0749 U.S.C. § 1436 (1958).
'The court admits this is not correct. On page 484 it concedes that the Board need not con-
sider the effect of its actions upon surface transportation.





however, is in the lowest possible level of fares, and is in direct conflict
with the interest of the bus company. Where the public interest is com-
patible with the interest of a party, there is no reason why the party can-
not represent both the public interest and its own. This is the situation
present in F.C.C. v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station,"1 on which the court
relied. However, the situation is not the same in the Transcontinental Bus
System case. The bus system cannot do justice to the public interest while
still properly representing its own interests.
The Sanders case involved an application for a competing radio station.
The existing station asked leave to intervene in the petition of the new
applicant, and appealed from the order of the Federal Communications
Commission granting a license for the competing station. The new licensee
contended that economic injury to a competitor is not a ground for re-
fusing a broadcasting license and, since the intervenor was not an aggrieved
party under the Federal Communications Act, they had no standing to ap-
peal. The Supreme Court held that economic loss to a competitor was not
grounds for refusing the license, but nevertheless gave the competitor
standing to prosecute this appeal. The basis for granting the appeal was the
extent to which such economic loss would be to the detriment of the
public, and would, therefore, be a ground for denying the license. Too
much competition would drive both stations out of business and would
be detrimental to the public, which would end up with no stations. How-
ever, this is distinct and different from the consideration that competition
between the two stations may cause economic loss to the original station."'
In Sanders the court said that to the extent the interest of the broadcast-
ing station was the same as that of the public, it could appeal and repre-
sent the public. There is no suggestion of representation of the public
interest where such interest is completely contrary to the private interest,
the situation in which the bus system finds itself. In addition, it should
be noted that the court in Sanders begins by distinguishing broadcasting
stations from telegraph and telephone companies. Although all are regu-
lated by the Federal Communications Commission, the latter are utilities.
The court specifically held that broadcasting stations are not common car-
riers, and are not to be dealt with by analogy to railroads and other carriers.
They are to be treated as being in a field of free competition."' The Com-
mission has power to grant or deny a license, according to the Act, but
has no control over the operation of the station, and as such is disting-
uished from a utility that is subject to public regulation, not only on entry
into the field, but also in all its actions in the field.
Finally, while the Sanders case involves two radio broadcasting stations,
both subject to jurisdiction of the same agency under the same terms, the
case under consideration involves two different modes of transportation,
each subject to regulation by a different agency, neither of which has any
control over the other.
"' 309 U.S. 470 (1940).
11 Id. at 476.
"' Id. at 474.
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The general rule of administrative law is that one who is, in fact, ad-
versely affected by governmental action should have standing to challenge
the action,114 and this is in accordance with Section 10 (c) of the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act. However, this provision is not applicable, because
the Board has no duty to take into consideration the effect its actions may
have on any other form of transportation. This distinction is taken from
Section 102 (b) of the Act, which provides that it shall be in the public
interest to regulate air transportation in such a manner that will recognize
and preserve "the inherent advantages of air transportation." This declara-
tion of policy is taken directly from the Motor Carrier Act, which is part
of the Interstate Commerce Act."5 Sections (a), (b) and (c) are exactly
the same in the two statutes except for the portion set out above. In place
of the above language of the Air Act, the Motor Carrier Act speaks of
intent to "improve the relations between and coordinate transportation by
and regulations of motor carrier and other carriers" [Emphasis added.].
It is established that the Board need concern itself only with the air in-
dustry. The court in Transcontinental Bus recognizes this, when it says:
. . . [t]he Board, on the other hand, is solely concerned with the needs of
air transportation and it need not specially consider the impact of tariffs on
competing surface or water carriers."
This decision, that the Board need not consider the effect of its actions
on surface transportation, has never been contested. There is no reason to
allow a surface carrier to contest such action. It would be immaterial
whether the action of the Board is injurious to the surface transportation
because under the terms of the Act, such would not be a factor the Board
need consider.
As TCO cannot represent the general public because of the incompati-
bility of their interests, and because TCO cannot represent its own interests
because the CAB has no duty to consider other methods of transportation
in determining air fares, it is submitted that the court of appeals erred in
finding TCO had sufficient standing to maintain its action. The action of
TCO should have been dismissed by the court.
IV. LEGALITY OF YOUTH STANDBY AND YOUNG ADULT FARES-THE
CIRCUMSTANCES AND CONDITIONS ARE SUBSTANTIALLY DISSIMILAR
FROM THOSE INHERING IN REGULAR ADULT FARES
The court of appeals specifically did not rule on the question of reason-
ableness of the rates, leaving that question to be determined on remand,
and based its order for remand solely on the question of unjust discrimi-
nation. The Board and the court both defined unjust discrimination in the
classic manner as "different treatment of like traffic for like and con-
temporaneous service under substantially similar circumstances and con-
114 DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 291 (1958).
"5 4 9 U.S.C. 302(a), as amended (Supp. II, 1965).
11' Transcontinental Bus System, Inc. v. C.A.B., 383 F.2d 466 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
390 U.S. 920 (1968).
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ditions...... Both the Board and the court ignored the question of "like
traffic," apparently assuming that youth are "like" traffic to full fare adult
passengers.
The court then found the Board ruling, that the inconvenience of the
standby provisions rendered the service "unlike" full fare reservation
service, was adequately supported by the evidence.11 This left only the
question of whether the circumstances and conditions were substantially
similar, and it is on this point that the Board and court appear to differ.
The question is what individual items may be considered in determining
whether the circumstances and conditions are so similar as to be unjustly
discriminatory. This can best be considered on an individual basis. First,
however, it is necessary to delineate the province of the Board and the
province of the court.
The court stated that the weight to be given the various factors in a
particular case is a matter for the Board, but what factors may be con-
sidered in a question of statutory interpretation, and consequently is for
the courts as well as the Board.' The court ruled that on review, the
scope of the reviewing court's power is limited to a determination of
whether the Board abuses its discretion,'12 but the court went further when
it declared that it is for the court to determine the proper factors to take
into consideration.
The Supreme Court has recognized that by the use of such terms as
"unjust," "undue," and "unreasonable," strict uniformity cannot be en-
forced, and was not intended by Congress. Rather, it was the intention of
Congress that such terms should be interpreted by the tribunal appointed
to carry into effect and enforce the provisions of the Act, taking into
consideration all circumstances and conditions which responsible men
would consider." The courts have always recognized that Congress in-
tended to commit to the Commission the determination by an application
of an informed judgment to the existing facts."' It is basic to an adminis-
trative agency that it is the interpreter of the will of Congress with its
specialized expertise. In regard to the ICC, on which the CAB is based,
it is said that:
[I]n effect, it is constantly performing legislative functions. It is true, of
course, that the Commission must be guided by the standards of action pre-
scribed by Congress. But these standards are usually couched in such gen-
erality of terms as to leave open an almost uncharted discretion in the disposal
of specific proceedings. There are no objective and definitive tests of "just-
ness" or "reasonableness" or "public interest;" and yet these undefined statu-
tory qualifications or their equivalents, frequently constitute the only guides
upon which the Commission must rely .... [A]nd the power of review, when
actually asserted, have been largely confined to the censorship of the Corn-
17383 F.2d at 481.
... For a full discussion of "like traffic" see V infra.
19 383 F.2d at 485.
120383 F.2d at 484.
"I1 Id. at 478.
"
2 Texas & Pacific R.R. Co. v. I.C.C., 162 U.S. 197, 219 (1896).
" United States v. Chicago Heights Trucking Co., 310 U.S. 344 (1940).
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mission's orders on constitutional grounds for want of statutory authority or
for absence of essential procedural safeguards."2
In speaking of the term "public interest," the Supreme Court said that
it is up to the Commission, not the courts, to determine whether a proposal
is consistent therewith."u
The specific statutory language of the Act provides in both the Declara-
tion of Policy, Section 102, and the Rule of Ratemaking, Section 1002 (e),
that the Board shall take into consideration in its determinations certain
specified factors set out in these sections, but it further states in both
sections that the specified factors are only among those which the Board
may consider. The Board is not limited to these enumerated, and in view of
the expertise attributed to the Board, it would be unreasonable to assume
that Congress intended that the determination of the other factors to be
considered should be left to the courts rather than to the agency having an
expertise in the area.
The court further held that the Board does not have license to resort
to "the full spectrum of social policy considerations which might rationally
bear on the issue, '12 but must limit its consideration to those factors which
Congress has by statute deemed material, and those factors which regula-
tory practice in the transportation industry has through experience found
relevant. In support of this proposition, the court cited two cases, both of
which concerned air mail subsidy and an attempt by the Board to avoid
following a specific section of the statute. Neither case involved considera-
tion of the statutory policy. Both are cases where the CAB chose to ignore
specific language of the statute,12' rather than cases of interpretation of
the scope of the statute. Thus, there is, in fact, no authority for the state-
ment of the Court.
The court spoke of "social policy" but did not define it. However, in
taking this consideration out of the statutory authority, the court limited
language so broad as to encompass almost any consideration the Board
could find relevant. The statutory language indicates Congress intended to
give the Board the broadest possible authority. If the provisions of Section
102 are not sufficiently broad, remember these are only some of the factors,
among others, (unspecified) which the Board is entitled to consider. It
would be very difficult to find anything that could not come within the
specifically enumerated provisions, particularly when accompanied by a
Board finding that it was to the benefit of air transportation. These pro-
visions were first set out in the original Act in 1938, and in spite of several
amendments to the Act since then, there has been no attempt to change or
limit the broad instructions given to the CAB in the original Act.
It is now appropriate to consider the individual items considered relevant
to a determination of the legality of youth fares.
'
2
"SHARFMAN, THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION, 7-8 (1931).
" Minneapolis & St. Louis Ry. Co. v. United States, 361 U.S. 173 (1959).2
' Transcontinental Bus System, Inc. v. C.A.B., 383 F.2d 466, 484 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
390 U.S. 920 (1968).
127 American Overseas Airlines v. C.A.B., 254 F.2d 744 (D.C. Cir. 1958); Western Airlines v.
C.A.B., 347 U.S. 67 (1954).
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A. Promotion of Traffic
The Board in its original opinion emphasized its policy of allowing air-
line management to exercise its discretion in attempts to increase passenger
traffic, improve the utilization of equipment and ground facilities and the
financial position of the airline industry, and to make available the benefits
of air transportation to a larger segment of the public. But the court held
that promotion could not be used as a justification for an otherwise dis-
criminatory rate without any evidentiary basis or rational justification.
In support of this proposition, the court relied mainly upon Hawaiian
Common Fares,"8 Tour Basing Fares"' and Free and Reduced Rate Trans-
portation Case."' These cases do stand for the proposition that promotion
is not a valid justification for an otherwise unjustly discriminatory rate.
However, the Hawaiian case was decided in 1949 and the other two cases
were decided in 1951. Other cases, both prior to and subsequent to these
cases, have held that promotion of traffic is a valid consideration. The first
of these was the decision upholding the validity of the air travel card in
which the Board relied heavily on the fact that in 1939 50 per cent of the
total passenger revenue came from cardholders.'' In the present decade, the
Board has several times based its decision on the promotion of traffic, if it
improves the financial position of the carrier."
The court said that in the past the Board has consistantly held the pro-
motional aspects of a tariff alone did not render the circumstances and
conditions of service dissimilar,"z and the court simply ignored the cases
holding to the contrary. In addition, it should be noted that one of the
cases cited in support is Ozark Air Lines Senior Citizen Excursion Tariff, s4
which is an order for an investigation on the basis that there might be dis-
crimination, based not on the age but on the fact that there is a difference
in age within the tariff, 65 for men and 62 for women. This case was
combined for investigation with Mohawk Airlines, Inc., Golden Age Ex-
cursion Tariff," a tariff which had been in force since 1951 pending an
investigation, and which had been allowed to go into effect in line with
the general policy of encouraging experimentation with promotional
fares." Analysis of the cases indicates that the opinion of the Board de-
pends on the current finanical status of the carriers. Therefore, in the
present period, where the average load factors are approximately 53 per
cent for the trunk carriers and 45.2 per cent for the local carriers,"' the
Board will favor any fare that may hold increase traffic if it is economic.
.. The Hawaiian Common Fares Case, 10 C.A.B. 921 (1949).
12 Tour Basing Fares, 14 C.A.B. 257 (1951).
"Free and Reduced Rate Transportation Case, 14 C.A.B. 481 (1951).
s.s Air Passenger Tariff Discount Investigation, 3 C.A.B. 242 (1942).
'aa See II at n.27 et cet.
"'Transcontinental Bus System v. C.A.B., 383 F.2d 466, 490 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
390 U.S. 920 (1968).
"'Senior Citizen Excursion Tariff Proposed by Ozark Air Lines, Inc., C.A.B. Order No.
E-21973 (March 31, 1965).
15Mohawk Airlines, Inc., Golden Age Excursion Tariff, C.A.B. Order No. 17111 (July 6,
1961).
" Both of these tariffs were withdrawn by the respective airlines prior to hearing.137 1969 Air Transport Facts and Figures 26.
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Even assuming there is a question whether promotion of traffic is a valid
factor, it is still difficult to find a rational basis for the language of the
court: ". . . [W]e do not believe that such a radical change in policy can
be justified. . . ,,... Not only is there no radical departure from previous
decisions (the first dating all the way back to 1941), but it is consistent
with the most recent decisions in which the Board has used promotion of
traffic as a justification for the validity of discount fares. Any radical de-
parture from precedent appears to be in the opinion of the court.
When the Board reconsidered this question, based upon the evidence
developed by the examiner, it stated that promotion of traffic, merely to
generate additional revenue for the individual carriers, might not justify
an otherwise discriminatory rate, but the Board must consider such in
light of its duty to encourage and develop an air transportation system,"3 9
and that in this light, promotion of traffic is a valid justification because of
its contribution to the quality of service available and because "a sound
promotional fare structure is vital to the continued progress of air trans-
portation." '' The Board has been careful to justify promotion of traffic
as a basis for discrimination even under the narrowest interpretation of
the court decision.
B. Age
Airlines favoring these fares argued that rates for specific age groups
have been traditionally permitted by regulatory agencies without being
considered in conflict with the anti-discrimination provision of the law.1 '
Both airlines and surface carriers have long offered special rates for chil-
dren under 12 and such rates have never been questioned. Why should not
another age group be also justified? Particularly in view of the fact that
special rates have been offered to this age group by the family fares.""1
In addition, both railroads and bus companies have previously offered
discounts to young people in the 12-21 age bracket without objection from
the ICC.'1
The court of appeals held that age alone is not a relevant consideration
because it is a factor based on status of traffic and is not related to trans-1 44 t
portation. Further, that reduced fares for children under 12 were a
"time-honored exception."' " While the court was not suggesting that these
fares were unjustly discriminatory, it did not appear to the court, or to the
examiner after taking evidence, that any justification existed for extending
this exception to another age group. "
'3STranscontinental Bus System, Inc. v. C.A.B., 383 F.2d 466 (5th Cir. 1967), ceri. denied,
390 U.S. 920 (1968).
'39Sec. 102(a), (b), (d).
14
°C.A.B. Order No. 69-8-140 at 11 (Aug. 25, 1969).
'
t Delta Reserved Seat Youth Fares, Order No. E-23656 (May 9, 1966).
4
'Brief of American Airlines, Inc. at 10, Civil Aeronautics Board, Doc. No. 18936 (Nov. 12,
1968).
143 Id.
'4 Transcontinental Bus System, Inc. v. C.A.B., 383 F.2d 466, 489 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
390 U.S. 920 (1968).1
5 id.
14"Initial Decision of Hearing Examiner, C.A.B. Doc. No. 18936 (Jan. 21, 1969).
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The Board, however, after reviewing the evidence taken by the exami-
ner, held the age limitation to be very pertinent. It found that because this
age group does little business travel, there is substantial elasticity and this
age group is more responsive to price than the market as a whole,47 that
the reduced fare increased air travel in this group, as shown by the increase
in traffic of this age group from 2.5 % of the revenue passenger miles in
1966 to 5.3% of the revenue passenger miles in 1968,'~' that while some
of this traffic would have traveled by air in any event, the new traffic
more than offset any diversion of existing traffic, and that the growth
rate in this group is greater than in other classes of traffic.
C. Competition
Another argument in justification of the youth fares is the competition
from all forms of surface transportation, automobiles,'49 bus companies"
and railroads.'' The examiner held that the mere fact that competition
exists for youth traffic does not compel a finding that the circumstances
and conditions surrounding youth fare passengers are different. The ques-
tion is whether the competitive considerations are sufficiently compelling
to validate the discrimination. The examiner did not find this to be so.'
However, the Board found this an important consideration and noted that
surface transportation is familiar to persons of all ages, regardless of eco-
nomic status, but in the case of air carriers, it is necessary to develop the
air travel habit in its customers."' This is indicated by surveys done by
Trans World Airlines which indicated that 55 o of the youth passengers
would not have flown without youth fares, and a Continental Airlines
survey indicated that 39.1% of youth fare passengers would have other-
wise used surface transportation."
D. Other Factors
Economic utilization of unused capacity is a consideration important to
the welfare of the airline industry. While the court noted that this was
considered by the Board," the court did not independently consider it,
but apparently combined it with all other considerations as "promotional
aspects." The Board, however, found that utilization of off-peak service
was an important incentive to the traveling public and that such would
enable carriers to increase daily utilization of aircraft and load factors"'
and that ". . . standby fares tend to be a self-executing traffic leveler which
induces eligible traffic to avoid peak travel times and to take advantage of
'
47 C.A.B. Order No. 69-8-140 at 13 (Aug. 25, 1969).
'" Id. at 12.
.
49 Brief of the Bureau of Economics at 24, C.A.B. Doc. No. 18936 (Nov. 13, 1968).
"Old. at 22; Brief of Delta Airlines at 9, C.A.B. Doc. No. 18396 (Nov. 12, 1968); Brief of
Air West, Inc. at 8, C.A.B. Doc. No. 18396 (Nov. 12, 1968).
"'. Brief of Bureau of Economics, C.A.B. Doc. No. 18936 at 22 (Nov. 13, 1968); Brief of
Delta Airlines, C.A.B. Doc. No. 18396 (Nov. 12, 1968).
"' Initial Decision of Hearing Examiner, C.A.B. Dec. No. 18936 at 67 (Jan. 21, 1969).
C.A.B. Order No. 69-8-140 at 15 (Aug. 25, 1969).
"' Brief of Bureau of Economics, C.A.B. Doc. No. 18936 at 23 (Nov. 13, 1968).
"'.5Transcontinental Bus System, Inc. v. C.A.B., 383 F.2d 466 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
390 U.S. 920 (1968).
... C.A.B. Order No. 69-8-140 at 15 (Aug. 25, 1969).
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space on less desirable flights.' '.. The court noted that even in the case of
the young adult fares, where the youth is traveling with a reservation,
the same effect is created because these fares are subject to blackout periods.
Greater management discretion is a consideration emphasized by the
Board as being within Section 102 of the Act, particularly (a) encourage-
ment and development of air transportation system and (f) promotion,
encouragement and development of civil aeronautics."'
In addition, the Bureau of Economics of the CAB argued that because
this is an accident-prone age on the highway, and the largest share of this
group would drive without youth fares, that these fares should be sus-
tained in the interest of highway safety.' Finally, local carriers argued
that these fares, because they are economically sound, contribute to lessen-
ing of subsidies."'
The question is then presented, even assuming none of the above factors
is individually sufficient to create circumstances and conditions sufficiently
dissimilar to regular fare traffic, (and this writer would not concede such)
whether the combination of several or all is sufficient justification to pre-
vent these youth discount fares from being unjustly discriminatory? In
other words, do these factors justify the discrimination when weighed in
the light of the pervasive requirement that "equality of treatment is para-
mount.,
161
The Board found that any discrimination was not unjust because the
circumstances and conditions inherent in the youth fares are substantially
dissimilar from those inherent in traffic generally."' In view of the court
opinion, the Board was careful to note that this decision was not based on
any one consideration, but, in reaching this decision, account was taken of:
ratemaking standards of Section 1002 (e) ; effect of these fares upon traffic;
need for adequate and efficient air transportation at lowest cost; relation
of these fares to development of an air transportation system adopted to
needs of U.S.; fostering of sound economic conditions in air transporta-
tion; promotion of adequate, economical and efficient service; and main-
tenance and support of competition."
Having held an evidentiary hearing as required by the court, and having
fully detailed the basis for its determination from the evidence presented,
it is submitted that there is ample basis to sustain its findings in the face
of any future appeal to the court.
V. LEGALITY OF YOUTH STANDBY AND YOUNG ADULT FARES-TRAFFIC
BASED ON AGE Is NOT "LIKE TRAFFIC" TO REGULAR FARE TRAFFIC
In Transcontinental Bus, the court assumed without consideration of
the matter that youth and young adult traffic was "like" traffic to full
' "d. at 16.
'58 CAVES, AIR TRANSPORT AND ITS REGULATORS, 140-68 (1962).
... Brief of Bureau of Economics, C.A.B. Doc. No. 18936 at 21 (Nov. 13, 1968).
60 Initial Decision of Hearing Examiner, C.A.B. Doc. No. 18936 at 75 (Jan. 21, 1969).
... Transcontinental Bus System, Inc. v. C.A.B., 383 F.2d 466 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
390 U.S. 920 (1968).
"




fare adult traffic. It then proceeded to dispose of the age factor as not a
relevant consideration in determining whether there are conditions and
circumstances justifying discrimination."' The court went on to say that
such statement applies only to the ages of 12-21, and that "We are not
intimating that the time-honored exception for children under 12 is un-
justly discriminatory. '16e
Unquestionably, reduced rates for children are a time-honored tradi-
tion. Not only in all forms of transportation, but in many other areas as
well. One need only look at the closest movie theater, sporting event, con-
cert, or other events to which tickets are sold. On the basis of cost, prob-
ably the baby under two does not take up a seat and his free transportation
may be, therefore, justified. In the case of the children's menu in a rest-
aurant, the cost of a smaller portion will be less. However, in most other
areas such as movies, sporting events, etc., there is not a cost basis justifi-
cation for a child's ticket.
Assuming that a time-honored tradition is entitled to some standing,
the next question is when does a practice become sufficiently "time-
honored" to be recognized? The youth fares have been in force for nine
years, 166 a relatively short period of time. In relation to the life of the act
itself, which is barely 30 years old, and in relation to promotional fares,
which were not really relied upon in a substantial way until 1951, less
than 20 years ago, nine years becomes relatively substantial.
Recognition over a long period of time is not, apparently, a justification
in itself. Family fares have been in force over 20 years, a substantial period
of time in airline regulation. Yet, the court in the Family Fare Tariffs case
rejected the "time-honored tradition" argument. Its rejection was based
on the fact that these fares had previously been in question, even though
all previous attacks on these fares had been rejected by the Board. 'What
is necessary in addition to time? Why is a rate justified if the age is 2-12,
and unjustified if the age is 13-21? What is the distinction between 12
and 13? It does not seem that this question has ever been answered.
It is submitted, however, that the proper question is not whether a fare
for a specific age group is unjustly discriminatory but rather whether a
fare limited to a particular age group is discrimination at all; whether age
12-21 is "like traffic" to regular adult traffic. If age 12-21 traffic is not
"like traffic" to regular adult traffic, then a difference in fare cannot be
discriminatory. There is no question of discrimination. The two fares can-
not bG compared to each other, and the only question to be decided in
"Transcontinental Bus System, Inc. v. C.A.B., 383 F.2d 466, 489 (5th Cir. 1967), cert.
denied, 390 U.S. 920 (1968).
16.$ Id.
" Youth Fares Proposed by Domestic Carriers, C.A.B. Order No. E-17367 (Aug. 25, 1961).
These fares were first introduced Aug. 1, 1961, providing for reservations within three hours of
flight time, with the privilege of standing by if reservations were not available. They were aban-
doned by the trunk lines in Dec., 1961, but were retained by Bonanza Airlines, Inc., Central Air-
lines, Inc., Frontier Airlines, Inc., Ozark Air Lines, Inc., Pacific Airlinesi Inc., Southern Airlines,
Inc., Trans-Texas Airways, Inc., and West Coast Airlines, Inc. This fare was still in effect for
these local carriers at the time American and Allegheny filed their new youth fare plans which are
presently under consideration.
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determining the legality of the youth fares is whether the fare is just and
reasonable.
The question of "like traffic" was not submitted to the court or the
Board in the Transcontinental Bus case. In fact, it does not appear that this
question has ever been directly presented or decided, although an analysis
of the cases concerning specific age groups indicate that indirectly the
decisions are based on the fact that traffic in a specific age group is not
"like traffic" to other age groups.
That children fares are valid in transportation is so well accepted that
few cases can be found involving such. Even the court in Transcontinental
Bus, while rejecting reduced rates for the age 12-21 group, was careful to
add that it was not suggesting that children's rates were in any manner
discriminatory.
The only CAB case directly covering rates for children (as distinguished
from students) is Full Fares for Unaccompanied Children,"' in which the
court held that it was not unlawful to charge full fare for a child without
an adult because the cost to the airline was higher than the cost of trans-
porting a child with an adult. It further held that a difference between
domestic and international rates was unjust discrimination because two
children on the same plane could be charged different rates, one in domestic
flight and the other in international flight. The reasons for the difference
was that it was customary in international flight to charge half fare,
whether or not the child was accompanied by an adult. On this point, the
Board held that the airline could either raise both rates to full fare or
reduce both rates to half fare. Either fare would be legal. The only illeg-
ality would be in making a distinction between domestic and international
flights. The court refused to rely on the Full Fares case because the court
found that it lacked "cogency."
While the court said that it examined this opinion with great care,16
it apparently overlooked the following clear quotation:
. . . [w]e think it is clear that the lawfulness of both the half fare and the
full fare were in issue insofar as discrimination and prejudice are concerned,
and the Board has full authority to direct that any unlawfulness in this re-
gard be removed."'
In holding the reduced rates valid, the court has accepted a fare based on
a specific age group.
In the Full Fares case, the dissent of Vice-Chairman Adams helps clarify
the decision, by pointing out that he does not dissent from the decision,
but rather from the approach of the majority. The majority found it law-
ful to charge full fare because of the extra service required in case of
travel by a child unaccompanied by an adult. The dissent held that the
cost of the unaccompanied child should be compared to the accompanied
child, not to the adult. In other words, the dissent considered the children's
16724 C.A.B. 408 (1956).
lesTranscontinental Bus System, Inc. v. C.A.B., 383 F.2d '466, 491 (5th Cir. 1967), cer.
denied, 390 U.S. 920 (1968).
"' Full Fares for Unaccompanied Children, 24 C.A.B. 408, 411 (1956),
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half fare legal, and as such it should be the starting point for considering
extra fare for extra service.
This decision makes clear that children's half fares are legal, although
no basis is given for the legality of such fares. There is no allegation that
special circumstances remove it from the category of full fares, and the
Board does not justify it as such. The actual holding of the majority'"
clearly indicates that children constitute a special class, apart from adults.
The dissent spells it out even more clearly; the rate set for children need
not be the same as for adults. In reference to the children's rates, the
children's "base" rate should be the criterion, rather than adult rates which
are not applicable. Furthermore, the majority opinion stated that the actual
rate set for children's fares was within the discretion of the management.
This proposition is even more clearly shown by two ICC cases which
directly ruled that age was a valid basis on which to base special rates.
These cases, In the Matter of Regulations Governing Sale of Commuta-
tion Tickets to School Children... and Bitzer v. Wash.-Va. Ry. Co.,'7
established the proposition that a rate can be established for an age group,
provided that such rate is not limited to a particular kind or class and does
not exclude other persons of the specified age group.
In the Commutation Tickets to School Children case, a rate was set that
was open only to students of a certain class, specifically providing for the
exclusion of pupils attending various other kinds of schools. The Com-
mission held this fare unjustly discriminatory under Section 2 of the
Interstate Commerce Act. The Commission added, ". . . [B]ut . . .carriers
may lawfully offer and use a commutation ticket limited in its sale and
use to children or young persons between certain stated ages (as, for in-
stance, from 12 to 21 years of age)." 17 '
The second case is similar to the Commutation Ticket case, and the Com-
mission again states that a special fare cannot be provided for students,
but that special rates can be provided for young persons based on age.
No sufficient reason is shown, however, why special commutation rates for
young persons between certain ages should not be established provided the
rates are not limited to pupils of schools of any particular kind or class
and do not exclude other persons between the same ages who travel under
substantially similar transportation circumstances and conditions. 74
All three of these cases were presented to the court in Transcontinental
Bus. The court rejected the Full Fares case on the •basis it lacked cogency,
but it is submitted that this case was not properly presented and analyzed
for the court.
170 The actual question put to the Board was whether, in view of half fares for accompanied
children, it was unjustly discriminatory to charge full- fare for children not accompanied by an
adult. The Board ruled that it could not require the airlines to set half fares for unaccompanied
children where it is shown that the costs of carriage are higher than for accompanied children,
because there is no regulatory rule requiring that accompanied children be charged half fare. This
fare is set at the discretion of management.
17117 I.C.C. 144 (1909)..
17024 I.C.C. 255 (1912);
17a17 I.C.C. 144 at'144 (1909).
"' Bitzer v. Wash.-Va. Ry. Co., 24 I.C.C. 255, 257 (1912).
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The court rejected the ICC cases on the basis that the pertinent language
was dicta. The court erred in this holding. If the Commission's only duty
were to rule on the legality or illegality of the proposed tariff, the court
would be correct. However, the Commission had the same duty the Board
has under the CAA. Specifically, under Section 1002 (d), it is provided
that if the Board finds a rate illegal, the Board shall determine the lawful
rate. 5 In view of this Board duty, it can hardly be said that the exercise
of a duty under its regulatory powers is dicta. It is, in fact, to the point
of the matter that the Commission has found a rate illegal and announced
that it would accept as being legal. It is directly in point here as it spe-
cifically used as an example the age group with which we are concerned.
The court also said that, in addition to being dicta, the actual decision
of the Commutation Rate case was based on In Re Party Rate Tickets, in
which the Commission had held that party rate tickets could not be
limited to a particular class but must be open to the whole public alike,
and such rate cannot be limited based on vocation."" The court is correct
so far as it went, but the Commission went further and said, in regard
to the application of the party rate doctrine:
The rule that if carriers desire to establish party rates, such must be open
to the general public and cannot be limited to the use of school children.
In this connection it should be remembered that the Commission's ruling
does not prohibit the publication of commutation rates for children of
specified ages, but merely holds that such rates must be open to all children
within the ages stated in the tariff:177
In other words, the Board in Commutation Tickets recognized fully the
impact of Party Rates, but simply did not consider that an age group was
a closer class."'*. Instead, the court considered age a valid distinction.
Neither of these cases, each decided over 60 years ago, has been overruled
by the Commission, the Board or a court.
The cases speak clearly on a subject seldom debated, simply because it
is usually accepted without argument. The bus company, while it con-
tinues to recognize rates based on age in its own industry, attacks such
rates of its competition.*" It is submitted that the clear language of the
court and the long standing practice in transportation should be recog-
nized.
.. The Hepburn Act of 1906, 34 Stat. 584, was an amendment to the Interstate Commerce
Act. This amendment became effective Aug. 29, 1906, and provided, inter alia, the Commission
with power to prescribe maximum future dates. See also SHARFMAN, supra note 124, at 45.
"' In the Matter of Party Rate Tickets, 12 I.C.C. 96 (1907).
... In the Matter of Commutation Tickets to School Children, 17 I.C.C. 144, 242 (1909).
178 The court further said that this case could not be considered, in addition, because Sec. 22
of the Interstate Commerce Act excises commutation tickets from the unjust discrimination pro-
visions of Sec. 2. This is incorrect because the Supreme Court has held that nothing in Sec. 22 in
any way restricts the Commission from declaring a rate unjustly discriminatory, unduly prefer-
ential or unreasonable. Nashville, C. & St.- L. Ry. v. Tennessee, 262 U.S. 318 (1923); United
States v. Pennsylvania R.R., 266 U.S. 191 (1924).
" The bus companies, as well as other ground transportation, have long recognized children's
fares. In addition, discount fares were offered to youths in the 12-21 age bracket without objection
from the ICC. The youth fares were voluntarily withdrawn by the bus companies prior to com-
mencement of action against the airlines.
[Vol. 3 6
YOUTH STANDBY FARES
To select a specific group from an age group, such as students, '8° to
limit a group in racial or religious ground,18 ' to favor a particular shipper,"
are all examples of discrimination. However, when the group is based on
age, without any limitation within that age group, then the fare is valid
because there is no discrimination. There is no question of justification for
unjust discrimination; it is simply that there is no discrimination. Neither
the ICC nor the CAB has made any attempt to consciously distinguish the
reason children are in a privileged class. It may be that no explanation
was thought neecssary, or it may be that the true significance was not
realized. The conclusion is, however, that like traffic that is not "like"
adult traffic, there is not need to justify the rates, vis-a-vis adult rates.
As a separate class of traffic, a rate may be set in regard to itself only.
No special conditions or circumstances are necessary to justify rates that
are different from rates offered to different traffic. It is submitted that
based upon reason and the decided cases, an age classification open to all
members of the age group is not discriminatory, vis-a-vis any other class
of traffic because it is not "like traffic." Such a rule would not be a license
for arbitrary tariffs because a fare would still be subject to the rule of
reasonableness and would remain valid only so long as it could be demon-
strated that such fare was economically sound.
VI. LEGALITY OF YOUTH STANDBY AND YOUNG ADULT FARES-
AN HISTORICAL BASIS
The beginning of commercial air service was the inauguration of air
mail service on May 15, 1918, to New York City, Philadelphia and Wash-
ington, D.C.'81 However, the first economic control over airlines did not
come until the McNary-Watres Act of 1930, an amendment of the Air
Mail Act of 1925."4 This legislation gave the Postmaster-General broad
power of economic control over air carriers for the purpose of increasing
passenger revenue and reducing the cost to the Government of carrying
mail. '
Until 1938, all federal regulation of air carriers was premised on the
carriage of air mail, upon which all airlines relied to stay in business. No
airline operating substantial routes could survive without air mail pay.
The cost of passenger operations was such that originally air mail con-
tractors had been unwilling or at least reluctant to enter the passenger
field.'
Between 1934 and 1938, there was considerable agitation for compre-
hensive legislation covering air transportation. This was due in part to the
increasing importance of passenger traffic, which by 1937 accounted for
'88Capital Group Student Fares, 26 C.A.B. 451 (1958).
18'Mitchell v. U.S., 313 U.S. 80 (1941).
1
8 2 Wight v. U.S., 167 U.S. 512 (1897); I.C.C. v. B. & 0. R.R. Co., 225 U.S. 326 (1912);
Louisville & N.R. Co. v. U.S., 282 U.S. 740 (1931).
183 New York Times, May 16, 1918, at 1, col. 1.
184 Act of April 20, 1930, ch. 924, § 2, 46 Stat. 259.
I" RHYNE, THE CIveL AERONAur'ICS ACT ANNOTATED, 22-3 (1939).
188 Westwood & Bennett, A Footnote to the Legislative History of the Civil Aeronautics Act
of 1938 and Afterward, 42 NOTRE DAME LAW. R. 309, at 313 (1967).
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68 o of the carrier income while air mail accounted for only 307o,'"' and
in part to the fierce competition for air mail routes. 8'
In addition, the cost of initiating operations was high. Competition was
limited by a provision forbidding an air mail carrier to engage in non-mail
operations "off-line" where it competed with the air mail route of an-
other carrier. There was, however, no control over carriers without air
mail subsidy, and the established carrier was never certain from what
source its competition would come the next day. For these reasons the
main push for regulatory legislation came from inside the industry itself,
from the air carriers. In addition, the general economic conditions caused a
financial crisis in the airline industry. This crisis was heightened by seven
major air crashes with the loss of 50 lives in 1936 and 1937.'" Further
financing of the airline industry was dependent on a showing of stability,
which the industry felt could best be shown by federal regulation."'
The Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 became law on June 23, 1938.82
It was an effort to avoid rate war, cut-throat devices, destructive and
wasteful practices, and to insure that economic power and recklessness
management should not be permitted to injure the smaller lines, the em-
ployees of the companies and the public. Its further purpose was to make
possible long range economic planning on the part of both government
and management."'
There was little discussion of the ratemaking provisions of the Act
because the sections were taken from the ICA, and it was felt that their
wording, in the light of the ICC experience with similar provisions, was
sufficient and clear and unobjectionable."' It was taken from the Motor
Carrier Section of this Act.' 'While many of the legal principles
which have proved to be in the public interest under the ICA can be used
also in the regulation of transportation, nevertheless those principles must
be applied with a clear understanding of their limitations and necessary
qualifications which must be made because of the differences between the
modes of transportation.9
The principal provisions of the ICA were, (1) Section 1, providing that
all charges be just and reasonable and declaring that every unjust and
unreasonable charge was prohibited and declared unlawful; (2) Section
2, prohibiting of direct or indirect charging for any services a greater or
less compensation from one than from another for a like and contempo-
raneous service rendered to a like kind of traffic; (3) Section 3, prohibit-
ing the giving of any undue or unreasonable preference as between per-
187RHYNE, supra note 185, at 35. The remaining 2% was express.
1 83 Cong. Rec. 6405-6 (1938).
199 Jones, Anti-Trust and Specific Economic Regulation: An Introduction to Comparative Analy-
sis, 19 ABA ANTi-TRUST § 261 (1961).
'9S. Rep. No. 687, 75th Cong., Ist Sess. (1937); Westwood & Bennett, supra note 186, at
322-23.
191 Jones, supra note 189, at 305.
1
.The Civil Aeronautics Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1301 (1958), formerly 52 Stat. 973 (1938).
19383 Cong. Rec. 6507 .(1938).
194 RHYNE, supra. note 185,- at 124.
119549 U.S.C. § 301 (1935).
199 RHYNE, supra note 185, at XVI.
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sons or localities or kinds of traffic; and (4) Section 6, requiring the pub-
lication of rate schedules and the requirement that such rate schedules be
followed. In regard to Section 6, it was said that no section was more
thoroughly responsive to a popular demand. "Midnight tariffs" and rebat-
ing had brought about utmost confusion, gross favoritism and dishon-
esty. 19
All of these sections have been incorporated in the Civil Aeronautics
Act. Section 1, requiring reasonable rates is in 404 (a). The prohibitions
against undue preference or unjust discrimination are in 404(b), and
Section 6 has its counterpart in Section 403 (a) (b).
It has been said that legislation was necessary in the airline industry to
prevent the disastrous rate wars and discriminatory practices of the early
railroad days,"' and to avoid cutthroat devices and destructive and waste-
ful practices."' The fact is that the background and history of the railroad
industry was entirely different from that of the air industry.
The railroads became a strong influence in the economy of the United
States in the 1830's. From this period up to the 1970's the railroads were
given very liberal charters which were mainly free of state and federal
supervision. In addition, they were usually given extensive public aid in
the form of land grants and money subsidies. The early attitude of both
government and the general public was favorable because of the interest
in this new means of "high speed" transportation, in opening of the West
to settlement, in settling public land, in pushing of the frontier West and
in the strengthening of the unity of national life.'
The public attitude changed, however, because of the evils that appeared,
such as highly speculative railroad holdings, financial manipulation, de-
structive competitive warfare, fluctuating and discriminatory rate adjust-
ments, and the overreaching exercise of monopolgy power. The collapse of
the railroad boom, together with general economic decline in the middle
of the 18th Century started the troubles. The railroads, in order to main-
tain the traffic they already had, and to protect it from the competition,
entered ino special contracts and secret rebates.
So widespread was the. practice and so demoralizing its results, that even
those who directly profited were forced to the conclusion that a system of
fair and open rates was far preferable to a basis resting on competitive war-
fare and personal favoritism.
Local discrimination prevented normal development of the country in
accordance with economic advantage. by creating trade centers given
special favors in rates, while the business of competitors or of intermediate
territory was depressed so that effective rivalry became impossible. Personal
discrimination in the form of free passes was a source of both political and
.. Atchison, The Evolution of the Interstate Commerce Act, 1887-1937, 5 GEo. WASH. L.
REV. 289, 314 (1937).
118 THOMAS, ECONOMIC REGULATION OF SCHEDULED AIR TRANSPORT (1951).
"983 Cong. Rec. 6507 (1938).
200 SHA RFMAN, THE INTERSTATI COMMERCE CoMMIssION, 14 (1931).
20' Atchinson, supra note 197, at 292.
19701
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commercial scandal, and used as a cheap means of corrupting public
officials and making the powerful shipper even more powerful. Rate
changes were made effective overnight, or found expression only in a
pocket-memorandum. Tariffs when published were not observed, and re-
viations were secret.' The growth of interstate commerce made it clear
that the problem could be controlled only by the federal government.
Demand for federal legislation was based on the discriminatory practices
of the railroads, the most glaring of which was the grant of personal
preferences to favored shippers. Sharp resentment at the manifest injustice
and baleful consequences of the rebating evil and at the subversive in-
dustrial tendencies inherent in rate maladjustments was the most potent
factor leading to federal legislation."'
The Interstate Commerce Act became law Febraury 4, 1887." In pre-
senting the bill to the Senate, the Committee said in part:
The provisions of the bill are based upon the theory that the paramount
evil chargeable against the operation of the transportation system of the
United States are now conducted is unjust discrimination between persons,
places, commodities, or particular descriptions of traffic. The underlying pur-
pose and aim of the measure is the prevention of these discriminations, both
by declaring them unlawful, and adding to the remedies now available for
securing redress and enforcing punishment, and also by requiring the greatest
practicable degree of publicity as to rates, financial operations and methods
of management of the carriers.'
Simple passage of legislation did not cure the evils. It took considerable
time and many amendments to the original Act to bring the practices of
the railroads under control. One of the most important amendments was
the Elkins Act of 1903," which provided criminal penalties for rebating
and other forms of discrimination, both on the part of the giver and the
receiver of the favor. The amendment immediately became a powerful
deterrent to the practice of rebating."'
A second amendment of particular importance is the Hepburn Amend-
ment of 1906.2 This amendment gave the Commission the power to con-
demn unjust and unreasonable rates, and also the power to determine and
prescribe future maximum just and reasonable rates. Later the Commis-
sion was given the power to set the minimum as well as the maximum
rate.
The case of Wight v. United States,' decided by the Supreme Court
over 70 years ago, is still cited as the leading authority for the basic propo-
sition that unlike treatment for like traffic under substantially similar
circumstances and conditions is unjust discrimination. The facts of this
202 Id.
203SHRFMAN, supra note 200, at 18.
20424 Stat. 379 (1887).
205 SHARFMAN, supra note 200,. at 18 n.14.
2"049 U.S.C. §§ 1, 6, 11, 14, 15, 16, 18, 20, 41 (1964).
207Atchison, supra note 197, at 325.
o Supra note 206.
'50Wright v. United States, 167 U.S. 512 (1897); Transcontinental Bus Systems, Inc., C.A.B.
Order No. E-26431 (Feb. 24, 1968), 2 Av. L. REP. 5 21,782 (1968).
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leading case graphically illustrate the type of problem with which the
Commission was faced. Bruening was a wholesale beer dealer in Pittsburgh
who bought beer in Cincinnati. His place of business was on the tracks of,
and he had a siding connection with, the "Penhandle" railroad. Beer at
the published price of 150 per 100 lbs was delivered to his door. The
"B & 0" railroad had neither track no siding to the door of Bruening, and
at the rate of 150 per 100 lbs., Bruening had to pick up the beer at the
station of B & 0, who, therefore, offered to deliver it to Bruening at the
same price. The cost of this service was determined to be 3 2 per 100
lbs., and Bruening thereafter offered to pick up his beer if he were given
a price cut of 3 Y20 which was done. He paid his bill at the rate of 15 0
per 100 lbs., and each month he presented his bill for delivery at 3 /2
per 100 lbs. There was no question in this case of the reasonableness of the
3 Y20 charge. The question arose because of Mr. Wolf, who had no rail-
road siding with any railroad, was required to pay 15 0 and pick up the
beer at the depot of the railroad. It was not simply a case of giving a cus-
tomer a hidden rebate, but, in addition, the railroad also discriminated
between individual customers.
Although Congress talked about the similarity of practices leading to
the ICA and the CAA, the background leading to each was entirely differ-
ent. In the first place, when the ICA was enacted the railroads were already
established in all of the United States, and it was acknowledged that the
railroad was the fastest and most economical mode of transportation, both
for passengers and for freight. In addition, competition had already been
established. It was not until 1920 that entry into the railroad field was
limited,"' and by 1887 there was competition between two or more lines
to all major cities in the United States."' The situation in the airlines was
almost exactly opposite. There was no clamor by public for control;
rather, the push for economic legislation for the airlines came from the
airlines themselves, based upon the desire of the established lines to protect
their investments and to prevent too much competition. As a practical
matter, the competition of the air mail carriers was limited by the re-
strictions of the Post Office Department" so that competition could come
only from the unregulated carriers, i.e., those without air mail contracts,
and these carriers were not strong enough to challenge the subsidized lines
at that time. In addition, the airlines were not a necessary form of trans-
portation. Until the airlines proved their ability in 'World War II, they
were not considered an important means of transportation. While rail-
roads were put under regulation because of their importance in the econ-
omy, the airlines only gained importance and became an accepted common
carrier after the industry was already under regulation.
While the rule against unjust discrimination was enacted to protect the
public against practices of the railroads, at the time of enactment of the
CAA, there was, in fact, no unjust discrimination in the airline industry.
210 FULDA, COMPETITION IN THE REGULATED INDUSTRIES, TRANSPORTATION, 10 (1961).
211 Id.
212Jones, supra note 189, at 302.
1970]
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
The most that could be said of the airline industry was that there might
have been some unhealthy competitive practices. Even on this point there
seems to be some question of whether this was fact or talk only, encouraged
by those interested in promoting airline legislation. 1'
What was the discrimination the OCA was designed to correct? Basic-
ally, it was under-the-table rebates and different treatment of different
individuals. The Commission and the courts enunciated the rule of equality,
but they did not mean that all were entitled to the same rates for all
purposes. It was not concerned with the published tariff, but with the rate
not in accordance with the published tariff, the rate given to some in
spite of the tariff, and the rate made in order to provide benefit to certain
individuals or areas that were not given to others. The Supreme Court
stated in an early decision that the great purpose of the Act to regulate
Commerce was to secure equality of rates and to destroy favoritism:
. . . [T]hese last being accomplished by requiring the publication of tariffs,
and by prohibiting secret departures from such tariffs, and forbidding rebates,
preferences.... ."4
That Congress was not concerned with the published tariff, but rather with
the unpublished tariff to special customers, is indicated by the necessity
to amend the Act not once, but several times. Congress was not concerned
with distinctions between customers and carriage, but with distinctions
made on an individual basis. The Supreme Court said that not every dis-
crimination was unjust, nor every preference or advantage undue or un-
reasonable. Rather all circumstances and conditions must be considered."'
This is not to suggest that any rate is automatically non-discriminatory
because it is published. It is, however, to suggest that the remedy provided
was intended to correct a vicious evil and an extreme situation. To de-
termine whether the discrimination is unjust:
. .. [A]ll circumstances and conditions which responsible men would regard
as affecting the welfare of the carrying companies, and of the producers,
shippers and consumers, should be considered by a tribunal appointed to
carry into effect and enforce the provisions of the Act."'
While the CAA gave the Board the power to regulate airline rates in
1938, very little attention was paid to rates until the 1950's. The carriers
had mail subsidy, and as entry of additional carriers was subject to ad-
ministrative control, there was no incentive for carriers to depart signifi-
cantly from the already established rates."7 While there was a great deal
of informal Board activity, in the way of ironing out technical tariff
imperfections and assuring compliance with tariffs format, there was only
one formal proceeding prior to World War II relating to rate regulation."'
"1'Id. at 306.
"
4 New York, New Haven & Hartford R.R. Co. v. I.C.C., 200 U.S. 361, 391 (1906).
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Board control of rate regulation has been a matter of great importance
only during the last two decades. Prior to that time, rate regulation did
not appear necessary, certainly not for any of the extreme practices which
required regulation in the railroad industry.
The proper conclusion to be drawn is that if the statute is followed the
presumption is that the rate is legal, and it should be overturned only on
a showing of real evil that the statute intended to correct. Where the tariff
is published, and where there is no showing of variance from the pub-
lished tariff, such tariff should be valid unless there is a positive showing
of unjust discrimination. This is further supported by the fact that no
cases have been found in which an airline failed to follow the published
tariff or was guilty of giving rebates. Whatever the reasons, the airlines
simply have not been involved in these types of practices. There is no
justification for judicially legislating new meaning to the statute and the
intentions of Congress.
It is submitted that the situation presented by the youth standby and
young adult fares is not the type of situation to which unjust discrimina-
tion was intended to apply. It is submitted that unjust discrimination was
intended basically to apply to rates not in accordance with published tariffs,
and in the case of published tariffs, only to those extreme cases which could
not be justified on any ground, the type of case presented by Smith v.
Northern Pacific Ry. Co. 1 It is further submitted that where there is a
reasonable basis in published tariffs, there can be no unjust discrimination.
The validity of such tariff would depend on the reasonableness require-
ment, Section 404 (a) of the Act.
VII. CoNcLusioNs AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Youth standby and young adult fares affect a substantial segment of
the population. However, the final decision on the question of discrimi-
nation will be even more far-reaching. Need to expand traffic during the
1950's and 1960's brought considerable experiment in promotional fares.'
The decade of the 1970's will require even more expansion if the huge
capacities of the Boeing 747, already in commercial operation, the McDon-
nell-Douglas DC-10 and the Lockheed 1011, scheduled for introduction in
1971, are to be utilized. The health of commercial aviation requires the
greatest possible flexibility.
It is submitted that under the law and the Federal Aviation Act, neither
the Bus System nor any other mode of transportation has authority to
question the legality of airline fares, and that the court of appeals erred
in not dismissing the complaint of TCO. 1 It is further submitted that
under the evidence producted, the Board was correct in determining that
the youth standby and young adult fares are not unjustly discriminatory
because there are substantially dissimilar circumstances and conditions.'
29 Smith v. Northern Pacific R.R. Co., I I.C.C. 611 (1887).
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It is further submitted that youths in the 12-21 age bracket are not "like
traffic" to adult traffic because age is a valid basis for distinction in traffic,
so there is no question of discrimination in the first instance. "
Finally, it is submitted that, in fact, there is no unjust discrimination,
because the statutory meaning of unjust discrimination was never intended
to apply to the situation present here; that, in fact, such was only intended
to apply to matters arising outside the published tariff, or not in accord-
ance with the published tariff, or to extreme situations under a tariff, but
that where there are any reasonable bases for such a tariff, there can be no
question of unjust discrimination."
It is conceded that the last two grounds have never been argued either
before the Board or the court. The fact that an argument has not been put
forward previously should not detract from its legal basis, particularly as
it has only been in the past two decades that rate proceedings have received
real attention from the Board. Today all rate proceedings, including pro-
motional rates, are of major importance, although the importance of pro-
motional fares varies in relation to the fluctuations in airline profits.
Airlines have risen from an insignificant forces in passenger traffic to
the largest carrier of passengers, apart from the automobile, in the short
span of 30 years. Of primary importance in that rise is the fact that air-
lines can offer the fastest service between two points, and the fact that the
management of the airlines has educated the public to the possibilities that
airlines can offer, and has offered a package that the public has found
attractive. Also important in this rise is the Civil Aeronautics Act which
was written with vision and foresight and which provided for the en-
couragement and promotion of air transportation, neither subject to the
problems of any other form of transportation nor at the expense of those
other forms of transportation. The CAB is to consider only the airlines
and the public paying the bills. This has proved to be the correct approach.
To allow a bus company, or any other form of transportation to question
airline activity, for the purpose of keeping itself competitive, can be of
value to no one other than the bus company itself. Certainly, the public
cannot benefit.
22 Supra V.
24 Supra V1.
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